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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The New York City Police Department (NYPD) is about to follow a number of 
other urban police departments down the well-worn path of gang policing. It does not take 
this path because New York City has a significant gang problem. Gangs ranked last and 
second-to-last among the causes of murder in the two years since the NYPD added the 
category of “gangs” as a cause of murder to its annual reports.1 Nor do gang-motivated 
crimes account for even one percent of the crimes that take place in New York City each 
year.2 Indeed, having recently transferred 300 new officers to the Gang Division,3 the 
NYPD has more new police officers in the Gang Division than the 264 gang-motivated 
crimes4 the NYPD identified in the 2013 fiscal year.5 With over six hundred police 
officers dedicated to “Operation Crew Cut,” announced in October 2012, the NYPD has 
quadrupled its gang division at a time when shootings and homicides are lower than at any 
time in the four decades since crime statistics have been maintained.6 
 
 Why would the NYPD commit more officers to gang policing than there are 
gang-motivated crimes in New York City? Why would it quadruple its gang division in 
two years during which violent crimes have reached the lowest level in recorded history? 
 
 The answer to these questions is that the class action challenging the NYPD’s use 
of stop-and-frisk7 threatened to foreclose the NYPD’s ability to monitor youth of color in 
the absence of crime based on appearance and geography. After years of stopping 
suspicious people in high-crime areas, the NYPD is addicted to profile-based policing. 
Since 2001, the NYPD has adopted a surveillance-based policing model in which the 
millions of fruitless stops were a concern only because of the political and legal pressure 
they created, not because of the violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. For the NYPD to relinquish the intensive policing of these 
suspect populations is unthinkable. The NYPD is driven by crime statistics and believes 
that aggressively policing a particular suspect class, which happens to be defined by race 
and class, is the reason for crime decline. It does not matter that the crime decline began 
before stop-and-frisk became the pervasive tactic it is today.8 Nor is this belief 
undermined by the fact that crime has declined in cities across the country and around the 
                                                
1 NYPD, Murder in New York City, NYC.GOV, 3 (2011) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Murders 2011], 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/2011_murder_in_nyc.pdf; NYPD, Murder 
in New York City, NYC.GOV, 3 (2012) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Murders 2012], 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/murder_in_nyc_2012.pdf. The other 
categories are Dispute/Revenge, Drug, Domestic, Robbery/Burglary, Unknown and Other. 
2 NYPD, GangStat Reports (2005–12) [hereinafter GangStat Reports] (on file with the author). The GangStat 
reports were provided to the author in response to a Freedom of Information Law request by NYPD Legal after 
three years and a law suit. 
3 Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Frisking Tactic Yields to Focus on Youth Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2013, at A1.  
4 See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text for NYPD definitions of gang motivated and gang related 
incidents. 
5 N.Y.C., MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/2013_mmr.pdf. 
6 N.Y.C, Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Kelly Announce 2013 Saw the Fewest Murders and 
Fewest Shootings in Recorded City History at NYPD Graduation Ceremony, OFF. MAYOR: NEWS (Dec. 27, 
2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/436-13/mayor-bloomberg-police-commissioner-kelly-
2013-saw-fewest-murders-fewest/#/0.  
7 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
8 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS 
CONTROL 7-14 (2012)(showing New York City crime drops beginning in 1990); Eric P. Baumer & Kevin T. 
Wolff, Evaluating Contemporary Crime Drop(s) in America, New York City and Many Other Places, 2012 Just. 
Quarterly 1, 4-7 (2012)(demonstrating that for some crimes that the crime drop began prior to 1990). 
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world regardless of policing strategies.9 
 
 Like any organization that enjoys success utilizing a particular strategy, the 
NYPD has enjoyed success in the form of declining crime during the last two decades 
while policing minor crimes and makings millions of stops. To change strategies is 
unthinkable. Thus, the NYPD’s challenge in the face of loss of legal and political support 
for stop-and-frisk policing is to create a new avenue for intensive surveillance of young 
men of color in a manner that avoids legal review or political opposition. 
 
 This explains the NYPD’s “new” focus on gang policing despite the fact that 
gang crime in New York is low. As it became clear that the NYPD was losing the battle to 
defend stop-and-frisk in the courtroom, the media, and the political arena, the NYPD 
issued dire warnings about the dangers of gangs and began trumpeting the success of 
“Operation Crew Cut.” 
 
 Who is not afraid of gangs? Or of gang violence? Who could object to policing 
focused on gang members? To date, no one has objected and the most important critics of 
the misuse of stop-and-frisk policing – Mayor de Blasio, Police Commissioner Bratton, 
and key city politicians such as Councilmember Jumaane Williams, have praised the shift 
from overuse of stop-and-frisk to gang policing.10 
 
 The gang narrative, however, is essentially the same as the narrative used to 
justify both the overuse of stop-and-frisk itself and the racial disparities that flowed from 
stop-and-frisk. Rather than requiring actual criminality, each narrative turns on two core 
concepts – place and person. Stop-and-frisk, according to the NYPD, was not directed at 
youth of color but at high-crime places and suspicious people.11 Indeed, according to the 
NYPD it protected the innocent people in these high-crime areas from the criminal 
suspect. However, during the Floyd trial (a class action challenging the use of stop-and-
frisk on Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection grounds), the empirical analysis of 
crime-rates by census track showed that the NYPD carried out more stops in black and 
Latino neighborhoods, whether crime levels were high or low.12 Within these “high-
crime” areas the NYPD focused on persons engaged in what they deemed to be suspicious 
conduct even though 94% of these suspicious people were not arrested after being 
stopped.13 The interplay of cognitive biases about place and appearance provided profiles 
that, to the police at least, obscured the lack of individualized suspicion and the racial 
disparities.14 
 
                                                
9 ZIMRING supra  note 8 at 15-18 (comparing New York City to other major U.S. cities); Baumer & Wolff supra  
note 8 at19-25 (placing New York City crime drop in national and global context).. 
10 Stephon Johnson, Stop-and-Frisk Makes Way for Operation Crew Cut, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS (Sept. 26, 
2013, 11:32 AM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2013/sep/26/stop-and-frisk-makes-way-operation-crew-cut/.  
11 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
12 Id. at 560.  
13 Id. at 660. Moreover, the New York State Attorney General’s review of arrests resulting from stop-and-frisk 
revealed that nearly half of these arrests did not result in conviction. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE 
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., A REPORT ON ARRESTS ARISING FROM THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT’S STOP-AND-FRISK PRACTICES 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_-PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf. Further, about one in six 
of these arrests were never even arraigned after being either voided by the NYPD itself or declined by the 
prosecution. Id. 
14 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Policing Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 267 (2012); James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race, FBI.GOV (Feb. 12, 
2015), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-enforcement-and-race (noting that unconscious bias 
and mental shortcuts drive different behavior and relationships between law enforcement and communities). 
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 The gang narrative, like the stop-and-frisk narrative, turns on the same core 
concepts – place and person. Instead of characterizing neighborhoods as “high-crime,” the 
NYPD now indicate that an area has a “gang problem.” Instead of stating that an 
individual is suspicious, the NYPD now state that he or she is a suspected gang or crew 
member. The gang narrative will be used, and has already been used, to justify an even 
more aggressive regime of stops, summonses, arrests, and surveillance than the pre-Floyd 
regime.15 The central concepts, however, like those underpinning the stop-and-frisk 
narrative, are defined so broadly that they can capture any neighborhood or individual the 
police deem suspicious. No criminal conduct whatsoever is required to be identified as a 
gang member. The gang allegation provides a facially race-neutral means for policing the 
usual suspects in the usual way.  However, because gang databases and intelligence are 
secret, this policing avoids both public and judicial scrutiny 
 
 This article takes on the task of challenging the NYPD’s new gang narrative 
before it takes root as a fully accepted justification for profile-based policing. The project 
is imperative because studies of gang formation suggest that gang policing encourages 
gang formation, hardens gang identity, and increases gang delinquency.16 It is not 
harmless to mistakenly identify and police individuals as gang members. Like the 
narrative that justifies stop-and-frisk, the gang narrative can obscure reality. Labeling 
individuals as gang members, trumpeting gang policing in the media, attributing crime 
decline to gang policing, and highlighting the relatively rare gang-motivated offenses to 
gain support for intensive policing exacerbates the adversarial, suspicion, and fear-based 
relationship between the police and youth of color. Further, gang policing affects 
communities as well as suspected gang members. 
 
 Part I of this article examines the NYPD’s crime statistics for New York City, 
demonstrating that claims of increasing gang crime are inconsistent with police-
maintained data. Part II examines the relation of Floyd to Operation Crew Cut, and links 
the Operation Crew Cut narrative to the creation of “moral panics” based on alleged gang 
crime in other jurisdictions in the United States. Part III provides background relating to 
the challenge of defining gangs and identifying gang members, as well as the definitions 
used by the NYPD to certify gang membership for inclusion in their databases. Part IV 
explores the harms that flow from using the gang category to justify police intrusions. 
Among these harms are violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment such as those 
found in the Floyd case. Additionally, the gang narrative is even more damaging to fabric 
of vulnerable communities because the narrative creates fear and condemnation that can 
encourage and reinforce gang ties and potentially increase gang violence. Finally, in Part 
V, I will examine existing alternatives to address gangs and gang violence. 
 
 The Floyd decision and the acceptance of its findings by the Mayor and the 
Police Commissioner and the joint remedial process all provide an opportunity for the 
NYPD to break its addiction to profile-based policing. The addiction will only be 
overcome, however, if the NYPD does not adopt malleable “suspected gang member” or 
“crew member” profiles to continue race, place, and appearance based profiling. If the 
NYPD successfully advances an exaggerated narrative relating to gang and crew violence 
in New York City, suppression of informal youth groupings may give rise to a more 
                                                
15 See infra Part IV.A below for description of gang policing. 
16 FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 10 (2000 ed., originally 
published in 1927) (noting that the transformation from informal peer group to gang is often precipitated by 
oppositional encounters, whether with other groups or with the police); Stephanie A. Wiley & Finn-Aage 
Esbensen, The Effect of Police Contact: Does Official Intervention Result in Deviance Amplification?, CRIME & 
DELINQ., July 12, 2013, at 1, available at http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/05/23/0011128713492496. 
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pervasive and persistent gang problem and will certainly perpetuate profile-based rather 
than offense-based policing. 
 
 Although this article addresses the particular example of the NYPD’s reliance on 
the gang narrative, the issue is one of national significance. Police departments across the 
United States have developed gang units and committed their forces to gang policing. Law 
enforcement and prosecutors have pushed for civil injunctions and enhanced criminal 
penalties, even as researchers demonstrate that youth typically mature out of gangs and 
delinquent groups and that negative police contact increases rather than decreases 
delinquency and gang ties. In an era of declining crime, the rise of intensive and secret 
surveillance of youth based on profiles, the intensive policing of these youth for minor 
offenses, and the imposition of extensive sentences based on theories of conspiracy and 
accomplice liability threaten to extend racial disparities in mass-incarceration into the 
indefinite future. At a moment when the overuse of stop-and-frisk and intensive Broken 
Windows policing of minor offenses have come to the fore as issues of racial justice, the 
expansion of gang policing initiatives extends the use of these very same techniques 
against the same suspect populations, while avoiding oversight and transparency. When 
police-community relations are strained by instances of excessive force against youth of 
color, the propagation of narratives about gang-involved youth of color as the source of 
most violent crime can only heighten the stressful and explosive nature of police contacts 
with youth of color. Thus, every jurisdiction can benefit from an objective examination of 
the data supporting the need for gang policing, and an evidence-based evaluation of the 
actual outcomes of broad police-led suppression efforts, narrowly tailored anti-violence 
efforts, and non-law-enforcement alternatives to addressing youth violence. 
 
I. GANG CRIME AS PRETEXT 
 
The dramatic nature of youth crime and the quasi-mythical construction of gang 
crime gives rise to a belief that gang crime is far more common than it actually is and that 
young vulnerable children are recruited into gangs where they engage in violent crime. 
More importantly, the conflation of gangs and gang membership with violent crime 
creates the misimpression that gang membership alone is a proxy for violent criminality. 
To assess the narrative that attributes large proportions of violent crime to gangs, it is 
necessary to attempt to disentangle myth from reality. 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to make clear that I do not claim that 
there is no gang-related crime or problems with youth violence and conflicts in New York 
City. New York City has always had gangs and will likely always have gangs.17 
Nonetheless, New York City has a far smaller gang problem than other large cities.18 
Moreover, a convincing case has been made that New York City’s lack of organized gangs 
and its minimal gang violence is because New York used non-law enforcement 
approaches to address gangs and gang violence in the past.19 In jurisdictions where gang 
violence has been used to justify additional resources for broad law enforcement-based 
                                                
17 ERIC C. SCHNEIDER, VAMPIRES, DRAGONS, AND EGYPTIANS KINGS: YOUTH GANGS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK 
(1999). 
18 See infra Part I.B for New York City data on gang offenses. See also NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., NATIONAL 
GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT: EMERGING TRENDS 47 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment-emerging-
trends (reporting that New York State is in the lowest category for gang violence in the range of zero to two gang 
crimes per 1,000 people). 
19 Judith Greene & Kevin Pranis, Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective 
Public Safety Strategies, JUST. POL’Y INST., July 2007, at 33–39, http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-
07_REP_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf. 
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suppression strategies, gang membership and gang violence have increased.20 Therefore, 
before arming the NYPD to engage in aggressive surveillance of and crackdowns on 
loosely organized “crews” of young people, it is necessary to examine the evidence that 
such “crews” are a major source of violence in New York City.21 
 
A.  National Crime Trends Versus Reported Gang Threat 
 
To put it mildly, law enforcement reports of a growing gang menace in the 
United States are in significant tension with the dramatic decline of violent crime across 
the United States. Between 1993 and 2010, the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(NCVS) has documented a decline in serious violent crime victimization of 77%.22 The 
Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Uniform Crime Reports provide law enforcement 
figures that similarly document a decline in the rate of violent crime of 51% between 1993 
and 2012.23 According to the NCVS, only 6% of victims of violent felonies between 1998 
and 2003 perceived the perpetrator to be a gang member.24 This perception is consistent 
with FBI homicide reports, which classify about 5-7% of homicides as gang-related 
between 1993-2003.25 Despite claims that gangs are corrupting ever more and ever 
younger youth, the rates of violence crime among youth under 18 appears to have declined 
more dramatically than rates for adults during the last decade.26 This is the case even in a 
state like California, which reports high numbers of gangs and gang members.27 In 
California, juvenile violent offense rates are lower than at any time during the sixty years 
that statistics have been kept.28 Indeed, the juvenile crime rates in the 1950s were 2.5 
times higher than they were in 2011.29  
 
The perception that gang violence is an ever-growing problem is fed by official 
law enforcement pronouncements. For example, according to the 2011 National Gang 
Threat Assessment published by the FBI, gangs and gang violence are a growing problem. 
In fact, the FBI’s National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) estimates a 40% increase in 
                                                
20 Id. 
21 As discussed below at note 53 a “crew” would certainly fit the NYPD’s definition of a gang.  Furthermore, 
Operation Crew Cut officers are in the Gang Division.  It is therefore assumed that crew violence should be 
captured in reports of gang violence in New York City. 
22 JANET L. LAURISTEN & MARIBETH L. REZEY, BJS, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 5 (2013), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpcncvs.pdf (“The rate of serious violent victimization—rape 
and sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault—declined 77%, from 29.1 per 1,000 in 1993 to 6.6 per 1,000 
in 2010.”). All violent victimization fell by 76%. Id. at 1. 
23 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, tbl. 1 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volume-
_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1993-2012.xls (reporting NCVS statistics reflecting both reported and 
unreported crime while the UCR provides statistics based on reported crime only). 
24 ERIKA HARRELL, BJS, VIOLENCE BY GANG MEMBERS 1993–2003 (2005), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=695 (providing estimates of the number and rate of violent 
crimes committed by offenders that victims perceived to be members of gangs based on the National Crime 
Victimization Survey data from 1998–2003: 55% of victims reported that perpetrators were not gang members, 
37% did not know). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at tbl. 32, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/32tabledatadecoverviewpdf. 
27 NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., supra note 18, at 47 (placing California among the five states with the highest 
prevalence of gang membership in the country). 
28 David Pimental, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults in an Era of Extended 
Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 92 (2013); Mike Males, California Youth Crime Plunges to All-Time 
Low, CENTER ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., Oct. 2012, at 1–4, available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/CA-_Youth_Crime_2011.pdf (juvenile violent crime decreased 
consistently since 1954). 
29 Males, supra note 28, at 1. 
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active gang members—from one million to approximately 1.4 million—between  between 
2009 and 2011.30 According to the law enforcement sources that provide information to 
the NGIC, these gang members were responsible for an average of 48% of violent crime 
in most jurisdictions and as much as 98% of violent crimes in some jurisdictions.31 
 
 The notion that gangs are growing exponentially in number and membership and 
are responsible for the majority of violent crime is nearly impossible to reconcile with the 
fact that violent crime, and indeed all crime, is down throughout the country.32 Some 
aspect or aspects of the law enforcement gang and crime narrative is awry. Either the gang 
problem is exaggerated or crime declines reported to the UCR are illusory. While there are 
certainly some sources that suggest that, in the age of computerized crime statistics, there 
is some pressure to downgrade and underreport serious crimes,33 the sharp decline in 
homicide numbers (which are not easily susceptible to manipulation) and the substantial 
decline in reports of victimization recorded by the NCVS confirm that crime has 
decreased by nearly 80% in the past two decades.34 
 
Before attempting to explain the impetus for exaggerating the extent and danger 
posed by gangs in the United States, we will turn to the specific case of New York City 
crime trends and gang offenses. 
 
B.  New York City Crime and Gang Trends 
 
New York City, like the entire country, has experienced declining crime in the 
past two decades. New York has been at the forefront of this trend, boasting crime 
declines of nearly 80% for violent crime between 1990 and 2014.35  
 
Despite the overall drop in violent crime and drops in youth crime, the NYPD has 
recently taken to the media and attributed 40% of recent shootings to loosely organized 
“crews” of “dozens of 12- to 20-year- olds with names such as Very Crispy Gangsters, 
True Money Gang and Cash Bama Bullies.”36  
 
These attributions are at odds with the NYPD’s statistics for crime, shootings, 
and homicides in New York City.  
 
First, according to the NYPD’s GangStat Reports which were obtained pursuant 
to a FOIL request, less than 1% of all crime in New York City is “gang-related” and only 
                                                
30 NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR., supra note 18, at 11 (attributing the increase in gang membership to both improved 
reporting and “more aggressive recruitment efforts by gangs”). 
31 Id. at 9. 
32 FBI, supra note 23. 
33 JOHN A. ETERNO & ELI B. SILVERMAN, THE CRIME NUMBERS GAME: MANAGEMENT BY MANIPULATION 170 
(2012); Dean Scoville, What’s Really Going on With Crime Rates, POLICE: L. ENFORCEMENT MAG. (Oct. 09, 
2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2013/10/what-s-really-going-on-with-crime-rates.aspx 
(“[C]reat[ing] an illusion of vulnerability, or strength, depending on one’s agenda”) (discussing history of 
manipulating statistics to either undercount or overcount offenses).  
34 LAURISTEN & REZEY, supra note 22, at 1. 
35 See NYPD, CompStat Report Covering the Week 1/19/2015 Through 1/25/2015, NYC.GOV, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_statistics/cscity.pdf (last visited May 1, 2015) [hereinafter 
CompStat Report] (recording a 79.76% drop between 1990 and 2014 in crime categories used by the FBI 
Uniform Crime Reporting Program). 
36 Associated Press, Teen Crews Linked to 40 Percent of NYC Shootings, TOWNHALL (May 1, 2014), 
http://townhall.com/news/us/2014/05/01/teen-crews-linked-to--40-percent-of-nyc-shootings-n1831975. See also 
Goldstein & Goodman, supra note 3 (attributing 30% of all shootings in recent years to crews based on 
Commissioner Kelly’s announcement of Operation Crew Cut in 2012). 
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a small fraction of that crime is “gang motivated”.37 A gang-related crime is a crime 
committed by any gang member or any suspected gang member whether or not the crime 
has anything to do with the gang.38 A gang-motivated crime is one that is done to benefit a 
gang or because of gang rivalries within or among gangs.39 Table 1 provides the number 
of gang-related and gang motivated crimes as reported in NYPD GangStats reports from 
2005 – 2012. The statistics demonstrate that NYPD attributed less than 1% of major 
categories of felony crimes40 in New York City to gang members through 2012.  
 
Table 1: NYPD GangStats 2005-2012 41 
 
Year Gang Related Crime 
Total 
(percentage of all 
crime) 
Gang Motivated Crime 
Total 
(percentage of all 
crime 
All Crimes42 
2005 907 (0.68%) 235 (0.17%) 133,774 
2006 1111 (0.87%) 321 (0.25%) 127,478 
2007 1009 (0.84%) 280 (0.23%) 119,841 
2008 943 (0.82%) 189 (0.16%) 114,487 
2009 1006 (0.99%) 134 (0.13%) 102,054 
2010 1001 (0.99%) 157 (0.16%) 101,127 
2011 990 (0.98%) 143 (0.14%) 101,220 
2012 1014 (0.95%) 99 (0.09%) 106,866 
 
The rarity of gang crime in New York City is confirmed by the NYPD’s 
contribution to the annual Mayor’s Management Report. For each of the past five years, 
the NYPD has provided statistics for “Gang Motivated Incidents” which have been 
published in the Mayor’s Management Report.43 Table 2, below reproduces these numbers 
for fiscal years 2009 – 2013.  
 
Table 2: NYPD’s “Gang Motivated Incidents” 44 
FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 
335 228 303 310 264 
 
Gang-related and gang-motivated crimes account for a greater percentage of 
shootings and homicides than of all felony crime, however, the contribution to these 
                                                
37 GangStat Reports, supra note 2.  Given the NYPD’s broad definition of “gangs” a crew engaged in violent 
crime or shooting should be captured in these statistics.  See infra text accompanying note 53. 
38 NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212–13: REPORTING GANG RELATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 1 (2000) 
(“Gang Related Incident[:] Any incident of unlawful conduct by a gang member or suspected gang member.” 
(emphasis added)). 
39 Id. (“Gang Motivated Incident[:] Any gang related incident that is done primarily:  
a. To benefit or further the interests of the gang, or 
b. As part of an initiation, membership rite, or act of allegiance to or support for a gang, or  
c. As a result of a conflict or fight between gang members of the same or different gangs.”) 
40 See infra note 42 for the major crimes included in “All Crimes” in the GangStat Reports. 
41 GangStat Reports, supra note 2. 
42 “All Crimes” include: homicides, non-fatal shootings, rape, robbery, felony assaults, burglary, grand larceny, 
grand larceny auto. GangStats are provided on a weekly basis, thus the numbers for each year are based on the 
last full reporting week of the year. Id.  
43 N.Y.C., supra note 5, at 4. 
44 Id. 
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categories of crimes is nowhere near the 40% that the NYPD has recently been attributing 
to “crews.” Regarding homicides, the NYPD published annual reports on Murder in New 
York City until 2012. Like the published statistics for “Gang Motivated Incidents,” the 
murder statistics contradict the assertion that gang-like groups are responsible for a 
significant portion of homicides. Gangs were not even included as a potential cause of 
homicides until 2011, and in that year only 5% of the 515 homicides In New York City 
were attributed to gangs.45 (Except for the category “Other,” this was the lowest of all 
categories of homicides in that year). In 2012, 9% of a total of 419 homicides were 
attributed to gangs.46 
 
The NYPD’s GangStat figures attribute an even smaller percentage – between 
2.6 to 5.8%– of shootings and homicides to “gang-motivated” incidents. Table 3 provides 
this data for the years from 2005 through 2012.  
 














2005 36 (2.3%) 27 (5.0%) 1533 540 
2006 49 (3.1%) 18 (3.1%) 1567 590 
2007 31 (2.2%) 13 (2.6%) 1441 492 
2008 43 (2.9%) 15 (2.9%) 1497 512 
2009 41 (2.9%) 27 (5.8%) 1407 460 
2010 57 (3.9%) 21 (4.0%) 1452 520 
2011 62 (4.2%) 14 (2.8%) 1482 497 
2012 38 (2.8%) 12 (2.9%) 1372 415 
 
As would be expected, the NYPD categorizes a higher percentage of shootings 
and homicides as “gang related.” A gang-related shooting or homicide would capture all 
incidents involving actual or suspected gang members even if the shooting/homicide 
clearly is attributable to a non-gang motive such as domestic violence. Even using this 
broader category, 80 to 85% of shootings and homicides are not gang-related. 
 
Table 4: “Gang Related” Shootings and Homicides 48 











2005 186 (12.1%) 82 (15.2%) 1533 540 
2006 198 (12.6%) 90 (15.3%) 1567 590 
2007 201 (13.9%) 76 (15.4%) 1441 492 
                                                
45 N.Y.C. Murders 2011, supra note 1, at 3. 
46 N.Y.C. Murders 2012, supra note 1, at 3. 
47 GangStat Reports, supra note 2. 
48 Id. 
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2008 220 (14.7%) 81 (15.8%) 1497 512 
2009 254 (18.1%) 80 (17.4%) 1407 460 
2010 300 (18.8%) 98 (20.7%) 1452 520 
2011 286 (19.3%) 96 (19.3%) 1482 497 
2012 283 (17.6%) 73 (20.6%) 1372 415 
2013   110049 335 
2014    33350 
 
Like gang-related crime, the NYPD estimates of new gang members do not 
appear to suggest a new gang menace. Each year from 2000 through 2012, the NYPD 
added from 850 to 1600 new alleged gang members to its database.51 Indeed, in 2011, the 
year before Operation Crew Cut was announced, the NYPD certified nearly 30% fewer 
new gang members than it had earlier in the decade. 2012 had even fewer additions to the 
gang database, and if the last four months of 2013 were consistent with the first eight 
months, the number of gang members added in that year would have been only about 700, 
a 30% drop from the 2012 low. 
 
Table 5: Individuals added to NYPD Gang Database 2005-2013 52 










2013 (through August 30, 2013) 470 
 
The NYPD might assert that it has not historically categorized crime by crews as 
gang crimes or included “crew” members in gang statistics. However, under the NYPD 
definitions of gangs, there can be no doubt that loosely organized “crews” that commit 40 
percent of violent crimes, would fall into the category of gangs. It would be immaterial 
that such a group had no defined hierarchy or leadership. Furthermore, individual criminal 
behavior is enough to qualify such a group as a gang; collective criminal action is not 
required. The NYPD Patrol Guide, 212-13, provides the following definition: 
 
GANG – Any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or 
more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary 
activities, the commission of one or more criminal acts, having a 
                                                
49 Edgar Sandoval & Tina Moore, New York City Murders Drop 20% but Not All Denizens Feel Safe, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nyc-murders-drop-20-2013-
not-feels-safe-article-1.1561930 (noting that there were 333 homicides and only 1100 shootings, nearly a 20 
percent drop in both categories between 2012 and 2013, and quoting the NYPD as attributing this decline in part 
to Operation Crew Cut). 
50 CompStat Report, supra note 30. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Murders in New York Drop to a Record Law 
But Officers Aren’t Celebrating, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2014, at A1 (noting there were 328 homicides in 2014).    
51 Gang Members Entered by Month, NYPD statistics January 2001 – August 2013, provided by NYPD Legal in 
response to FOIL request. 
52 Id. 
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common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose 
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a 
pattern of criminal gang activity.53 
 
Any “crew” of youths committing violent crimes with a name like “Very Crispy 
Gangsters” would certainly be considered a gang within this definition. 
 
 Operation Crew Cut has resulted in the quadrupling of the Gang Division from 
150 officers to 600 in just four years. The narrative attached to it is that of an emerging 
form of criminality – a “shifted paradigm,” as Deputy Harrington phrased it when 
addressing the City Council in hearings on Operation Crew Cut.54 Shootings have 
remained remarkably consistent during the past decade and dropped precipitously in 2013 
to 1093 shootings for the year.55 If crews have emerged as a new threat committing 40% 
of shootings, all other offenders in New York City must have very abruptly reformed 
substantially. Alternatively, the NYPD has simply chosen to re-label or exaggerate the 
threat of violence by crews.56  
 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION CREW CUT AND THE STOP AND FRISK 
LITIGATION 
 
The narrative that “crews” of young people are responsible for a large percentage 
of shootings in New York City was first advanced by Police Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly in October of 2012, when he announced Operation Crew Cut.57 This announcement 
came just months after an order in Floyd v. City of New York granting class certification 
to: 
 
All persons who since January 31, 2005 have been, or in the future will 
be subjected to the New York Police Department’s policies and/or 
widespread customs or practices of stopping, or stopping and frisking 
persons . . . in violation of the Fourth Amendment, including persons 
stopped or stopped and frisked on the basis of being Black or Latino in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. . . .58 
 
The decision accompanying the order was twenty pages long, included extensive 
references to the discovery materials, and laid out the basis for concluding that the class of 
individuals described by the plaintiffs in Floyd represented hundreds of thousands of New 
                                                
53 NYPD PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212–13, supra note 38, at 1. 
54 N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Pub. Safety, Oversight: The NYPD’s Operation Crew Cut and Crime Reduction 
Strategies for NYCHA, N.Y.C. COUNCIL (Apr. 28, 2014, 1:00 PM), 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/MeetingDetail.-aspx?ID=304831&GUID=66D6AF49-65A7-4AA8-851E-
DA8755D55FED&Options=info|&Search=. Deputy Harrington’s comment occurs at 1:15:16 in the hearing 
video. 
55 Sandoval & Moore, supra note 49. 
56 See Mercer L. Sullivan, Maybe We Shouldn't Study “Gangs”: Does Reification Obscure Youth Violence?, 21 
J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 170 (2005) for a discussion of how labeling can increase the perception of gang 
problems in the absence of increased criminality. Mercer explains why the supposed proliferation of national 
gangs in New York in the 1990s did not increase serious youth crime but merely relabeled existing beefs. Id. 
57 Richard Esposito, New York’s Kelly Plans “Crew Cut” for Gang Members, WORLD NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/nypd-plans-crew-cut-gang-members/story?id=17370903&singlePage=true; Daniel 
Beekman, Bronx Community Leaders Praise New NYPD Anti-gang Initiative, Argue More Youth Programs Are 
Also Needed: NYPD Gang Division to Double in Size in Intensive Effort to Stem Shootings, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/city-top-raymond-kelly-announces-operation-
crew-cut-article-1.1173045. 
58 Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting class certification, May 16, 2012). 
 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5 12 
Yorkers of color, who faced a heightened risk of being stopped, frisked, and subjected to 
use of force in violation of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.59 A trial date 
was also set, but with the certification of the class, the NYPD’s stop and frisk activity 
declined for the first time in decades. While the NYPD were on track in the first quarter of 
2012 to exceed the 685,000 stops they made in 2011, by the end of the year only 533,000 
stops were reported (a 22% drop).60 In 2013, the number of reported stops plunged to 
about 190,000.61 
 
Furthermore, in contrast to dire predictions that crime would increase if the 
NYPD were not permitted to continue the regime of stop and frisks, homicides dropped 
nearly 20% between 2011 and 2012 (from 515 to 419), and another 20% between 2012 
and 2013 (from 419 to 335).62 As the weekly CompStat data came through in the fall of 
2012, a thinking person might have concluded that the intensive policing of innocent 
young men of color really was not responsible for the drop in crime. 
 
 There can be no doubt that in October 2012, when Commissioner Kelly 
announced that “crews” were responsible for at least 30% of shootings in New York City 
and that the NYPD was doubling the number of officers in the Gang Division to police 
these youth,63 he was aware that homicides would likely drop to a historic low in 2012. 
The NYPD also faced an upcoming trial based on assertions of racial profiling and 
unconstitutional stops.64 The announcement of a new menace to society, however, 
together with frightening rhetoric about kids who would hurt you for invading their turf,65 
served both to give the NYPD a new justification for intensively policing young men of 
color and to overshadow any argument that stop and frisk was not a deterrent to crime. 
 
 In his announcement of Operation Crew Cut, Commissioner Kelly defined the 
problem as “not . . . large, established gangs such as the Bloods and Crips, but . . . the 
looser associations of younger men who identify themselves by the block they live on, or 
on which side of a housing development they reside.”66 Although, feuding crews did exist 
and do cause problems, the NYPD was already collaborating with the District Attorneys 
and federal prosecutors and its Gang Division was already collecting evidence on crews 
that were in active conflict. The new resources poured into the Gang Division via 
Operation Crew Cut allowed an expansion of intensive policing of individuals based on 
the block or housing development where they reside beyond the investigation of these 
existing conflicts.67 No increase in crime accounted for the massive increase of resources 
into Operation Crew Cut. 
 
 The use of the gang menace to create a moral panic68 and increase support for 
                                                
59 Id. at 158–78. 
60 Racial Justice: Stop-and-Frisk Data, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited 
May 1, 2015). 
61 Id. 
62 Historical New York City Crime Data: Citywide Seven Major Felony Offenses 2000–2014, NYPD 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/excel/analysis_and_planning/seven_major_felony_offenses_2000_20
14.xls (last visited May 1, 2015). 
63 Beekman, supra note 57. 
64 Floyd, 283 F.R.D. 153. 
65 Esposito, supra note 57 (quoting Commissioner Kelly as reporting that crews’ “rivalries are based not on 
narcotics trafficking or some other entrepreneurial interest, but simply on local turf.”) 
66 Rocco Parascandola, NYPD to Double Gang Division to Combat Street Violence: Commissioner Kelly, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-double-gang-division-article-
1.1172347. 
67 Id. 
68 See generally STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (3d ed. 2002) (updating the seminal 1972 
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intensive profile-based policing is a well-established policing tactic.69 In studies across the 
country, law enforcement has been able to push through legislation and obtain resources 
and support by providing the media with stories recounting increased gang crime 
violence.70 The media is not necessarily a victim in the creation of moral panic but may 
benefit commercially from sensational and disproportionate coverage of youth and gang 
violence, which in turn reshapes public opinion and criminal justice policy as well.71 
While moral panics may involve any type of deviant behavior, they have been used 
extensively to highlight the risk of youth gang violence even in an era when youth gang is 
declining.72 
 
In a moral panic, the public, the media, and politicians reinforce 
each other in an escalating pattern of intense and disproportionate 
concern in response to a perceived social threat posed by a particular 
group of individuals. . . . Although sometimes the targeted enemy poses 
an imaginary threat (the Salem “witches,” for example), more often a 
moral panic focuses on individuals who do real harm, such as sexual 
abusers or members of criminal street gangs. . . . But what distinguishes 
a moral panic from an effort to deal with a pressing social problem is 
the gap between the perception of the problem and the reality. In a 
moral panic, the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders 
are greatly exaggerated.73  
 
While the predominant narrative throughout the Bloomberg/Kelly era was that 
the NYPD had made New York the safest city in the world, by the fall of 2012 the press 
started publishing more and more stories about local crews, suggesting that New York 
was, in fact, a city facing new dangers.74 These stories had always existed, but the threat 
                                                                                                                      
book on the moral panic generated around conflicts between the Mods and Rockers in 1960s England); CHARLES 
KRINSKY ET AL., THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO MORAL PANICS, (Charles Krinksy ed., 2013) 
(providing an overview by various authors of types of moral panics, the role of media, and the impact on 
governance). 
69 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 108–12 (2008) (discussing 
the passage of Proposition 21 in California based on a moral panic about juvenile crime); John M. Hagedorn, 
Gang Violence in the Postindustrial Era, 24 CRIME & JUST. 365, 376 (1998) (noting the tendency to construct 
male gangs as deviant during moral panics); Marjorie Zatz, Chicano Youth Gangs and Crime: The Creation of a 
Moral Panic, 11 CONTEMP. CRISES 129 (1987); Marjorie Zatz, Los Cholos: Legal Processing of Chicano Gang 
Members, 33 SOC. PROBS. 13 (1985). 
70 See Richard C. McCorkle & Terance D. Miethe, The Political and Organizational Response to Gangs: An 
Examination of a “Moral Panic” in Nevada, 15 JUST. Q. 41 (1998); Carol A. Archbold & Michael Meyer, 
Anatomy of a Gang Suppression Unit: The Social Construction of an Organizational Response to Gang 
Problems, 2 POLICE Q. 184, 189–98 (1999) (recounting a particularly dramatic response to a moral panic caused 
by a single homicide in a town 80 miles away in response to which police in a midsized Midwestern town 
redefined all crime committed by anyone under 18 as “gang related” and thereby “document” a gang problem 
that required resources to establish a gang suppression unit). 
71 Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes 
Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 397–98 (2006). 
72 David Pimental, supra note 28, at 92 (discussing how fear of juvenile violence has driven us to punish 
American youth as adults, even in the face of historic lows in juvenile crime); Jodi Lane, Fear of Gang Crime: A 
Qualitative Examination of the Four Perspectives, 39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 437 (2002) (presenting several 
theoretical models that might explain why fear of gang violence in parts of Southern California exceeds the 
actual danger of gang violence). 
73 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 69, at 109–10 (linking moral panic over youth crime to the adoption of 
Proposition 21 which required many juveniles to be tried as adults, barred sealing of juvenile records, and 
extended prison terms for gang-related crimes.  Concluding that “Proposition 21 was adopted by a “public who 
inaccurately thought that youths were responsible for most crime and that juvenile crime was on the rise.”). 
74 For a cluster of articles in mainstream liberal media focusing on the threat of a new type of youth violence and 
the NYPD’s response that came out within weeks of the gang raid in June 2014 see, for example, Mosi Secret, 
On the Brink in Brownsville, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 1, 2014, 
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and the number of offenses were exaggerated. In the fall of 2013, Commissioner Kelly 
expressly linked the shift from stop-and-frisk policing to policing of crews, when he 
announced a second doubling of the size of the NYPD’s Gang Division.75 By highlighting 
a new threat,76 he was able to garner support for a form of policing that differs more in 
form than in substance from the prior regime of profile-based stop-and-frisk. Even the 
biggest critics of stop-and-frisk policing expressed approval for focusing police resources 
on “crews” who were responsible for forty percent of shootings, despite the fact that only 
isolated stories support this narrative.77 Under the new police commissioner and the de 
Blasio administration the commitment to Operation Crew Cut has continued unabated.78 
 
The larger concern raised by this paper, however, is the fact that there is no 
definition for “crews,” no transparency about who will be considered a possible crew or 
gang member. Examined closely, policing kids because of associations based on where 
they live, is not fundamentally different from the stop and frisk regime. Indeed, policing of 
gangs and crews is more worrisome. First, stop-and-frisk policing is subject to Fourth 
Amendment requirements and gives rise to occasional review in either criminal or civil 
cases. Second, gang policing relies on police-developed secret lists, secret surveillance, 
secret criteria, and is not governed by either constitutional or statutory requirements. 
Finally, the crew/gang label can be used to justify even harsher treatment than a stop-and-
frisk, both for those who are labeled as crew members and for those who associate with 
alleged crew members either in public or in private. 
 
In the following section the lack of meaningful definitions for gangs, the lack of 
process, and the vague criteria for certifying gang membership will be reviewed. 
 
III. THE NYPD’S GANG DEFINITIONS AND DATABASE 
 
In May of 2010, the NYCLU filed a lawsuit, Lino v. City of New York, 
challenging the NYPD’s practice of maintaining an electronic database containing 
information relating to every individual that the NYPD stopped or stopped and frisked, 
even when the stop did not result in a summons or arrest.79 The public outrage that the 
NYPD was keeping an electronic database with identifying information on innocent New 
Yorkers was widespread.80 On July 16, 2010, less than two months after the database was 
challenged, the criminal procedure law was amended to prohibit the maintenance of an 
electronic database containing identifying information for individuals stopped and 
“released without further legal action.”81 Lino was settled in August 2013, when the City 
agreed to remove information from the database relating to people whose cases were 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/on-the-brink-in-brownsville.html; Eric Konigsberg, Woo Cho 
Bang Bang, NYMAG.COM (June 19, 2014), http://nymag.com/news/features/brownsville-2014-6/; Matthew 
McKnight, De Blasio’s Violent-Crime Challenges, NEW YORKER (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/de-blasios-violent-crime-challenges (interviewing Jeffrey Fagan 
about the alleged increase in violent crime to 2014). 
75 Goldstein & Goodman, supra note 3. 
76 See Esposito supra note 57. 
77 Johnson, supra note 10 (indicating that Operation Crew Cut had the backing of stop-and-frisk critics, Bill de 
Blasio and Jumaane Williams). 
78 J. David Goodman & Joseph Goldstein, Bratton Takes Helm of Police Force He Pledged to Change, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2014, A14. 
79 Lino v. City of New York, 958 N.Y.S.2d 11, 13 (App. Div. 2012). 
80 Rocco Parascandola, Gov. Paterson Signs Law Forcing NYPD to Delete Stop and Frisk Database, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (July 16, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/gov-paterson-signs-law-forcing-nypd-delete-
stop-frisk-database-article-1.467911. 
81 N.Y. CPL §140.50(4) (McKinney 2010). 
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subsequently dismissed or resolved with no criminal conviction.82 
 
Where the legislation closes a door, however, gang policing opens a window 
(albeit, a pre-existing window). Although it is not a crime to be in a gang,83 law 
enforcement agencies across the country have started to maintain extensive databases of 
gang members or associates and suspected gang members and associates.84 There is no 
right to notice or procedure for challenging inclusion in gang databases.85 The challenge 
of defining gangs has been one that has long plagued researchers, law enforcement, courts, 
and scholars. Thus, there are no generally accepted definitions for gangs and no 
universally applicable method for determining gang membership.86 Nonetheless, there are 
commonalities in the definitions used by law enforcement in the United States for defining 
gangs and, more importantly, for “certifying” gang membership or association for the 
purpose of collecting intelligence on suspected gang members.87 
 
The most important commonality is that there is no jurisdiction that requires 
proof (or even reasonable suspicion) of any criminality on the part of an individual in 
order to certify him as a gang member or associate.88 Instead, individuals can be certified 
as gang members or associates, based on appearance, association, location, law 
enforcement “intelligence,” or informants. There is no notification of inclusion in gang 
databases and no right to challenge inclusion.89 
 
Thus, although the NYPD cannot maintain electronic data on those stopped-and-
frisked but not arrested or given a summons, the NYPD gang database allows the NYPD 
to maintain identifying data, including name, address, and social security number on 
individuals without even a pretense of reasonable suspicion.90 Indeed, the NYPD gang 
database does not require any information regarding criminality whatsoever. The criteria 
used by the NYPD to “qualify” an individual as an “Identified Gang Member” were 
provided to the author January 7, 2014, in response to a FOIL request filed on September 
2, 2011.91 The criteria are listed on the Intelligence Division (I.D.S.) Gang Entry Sheet, 
and an individual can be certified in any of the following three ways: 
                                                
82 NYCLU Settlement Ends NYPD Practice of Keeping New Yorkers in Stop-and-Frisk Database, NYCLU (Aug. 
7, 2013), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nyclu-settlement-ends-nypd-practice-of-keeping-new-yorkers-stop-and-
frisk-database. 
83 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457–58 (1939). 
84 For examples of typical criteria for inclusion in gang databases see NAT’L GANG CTR., BRIEF REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL AND STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS “GANG,” “GANG CRIME,” AND “GANG MEMBER” (2012), 
available at https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Content/Documents/Definitions.pdf. 
85 Joshua D. White, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 115, 118 (2005). One 
recent exception to this general rule is California which passed legislation granting notice and an opportunity to 
challenge gang designation to parents or guardians and minors under the age of 18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.34 
(West 2014). 
86 K. Babe Howell, Fear Itself: The Impact of Allegations of Gang Affiliation on Pre-Trial Detention, 23 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 620, 643–47 (2011). 
87 NAT’L GANG CTR., supra note 84, at 2–3. 
88 Id. at 3–8. Of the seven states that have legislative criteria for identifying gang members and associates, none 
requires any criminal conviction or arrest. Instead, each requires that two or more criteria of a list be met. The list 
typically includes such items as, self-admission, dress, tattoos, correspondence with gang members, and the 
rather circular “identified as criminal street gang members by law enforcement.” Id.  As discussed below, 
Minnesota has a database that requires a gross misdemeanor conviction but it also has second database that does 
not require criminality.  See text infra at note 104-110. 
89 See sources cited supra note 85. 
90 The NYPD does not share its database with the federal government or others. E-mail Response from N.Y.C. 
Police Dep’t Legal Bureau to author, (March 24, 2014) (on file with author). Therefore it is not bound by 28 
C.F.R. § 23.20 which requires reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct or activity and compliance reviews every 
five years for shared intelligence databases. 28 C.F.R. § 23.20 (2015). 
91 NYPD, I.D.S. GANG ENTRY SHEET (obtained by FOIL from NYPD, on file with the author). 
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1. An individual will be entered if he/she admits to membership 
during debriefing OR 
2. Through the course of an investigation an individual is reasonably 
believed to belong to a gang and is identified as such by two 
independent sources. (Ex. Pct. Personnel, Intell, School Safety, 
Dept. of Correction, or Outside Agency) … OR 
3. Meets any Two below mentioned criteria 
o Known gang Location 
o Scars/Tattoos Associated w/ Gangs 
o Gang Related Documents 
o Colors Associated w/ Gangs 
o Association w/ Known Gang members 
o Hand Signs Associated with Gangs92 
 
None of the three methods for certifying gang members and adding them to the NYPD’s 
database requires any arrest or criminal conduct.93 Nor is there any requirement or 
provision for notifying individuals that they are included in gang databases or for purging 
names from gang databases.94 For the period covered by the FOIL request (January 2001 – 
August 2013), the NYPD Legal Bureau responded that they could locate no documents 
related to maintenance or guidelines regarding purging of the database.95 
 
As of August 30, 2013, the NYPD’s Gang Database included over 20,000 
individuals.96 Of the 21,537 who were added between January 2001 and August 30, 2013, 
just one percent (212 individuals) of those entered into the gang database were categorized 
as Caucasian or white.97 Approximately 48% of the individuals added to the database 
between 2003 and 2013 were identified by the NYPD as black, another 42% Hispanic, 
nearly 8% “unidentified” and less than 4% were female.98 About 30% were under 18 years 
of age when they were added to database.99 Because of widely accepted narratives 
regarding gang membership, these percentages may not strike the reader as under-
representative of white or female gang membership or over-inclusive of black and Latinos. 
However, criminologist and youth gang researchers find that gang membership is rare 
among all races but substantially more common among white youth than law enforcement 
statistics estimates, with white gang members accounting for 25% or more of all gang 
members.100  
                                                
92 Id. 
93 This is typical of gang databases across the country. There are no generally accepted definitions for gangs and 
no universally applicable method for determining gang membership. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 86, at 643–47. 
One commonality, however, is that criminal conduct is not necessary for inclusion in gang databases. Id.  
94 E-mail Response from NYPD Legal Bureau to author, supra note 90. 
95 Id. 
96 See NYPD Gang Members by Age, (obtained by FOIL from NYPD, on file with author); Joseph Goldstein, 




100 See, e.g. Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, supra note 19, at 37 (noting that white youth accounted for 40% of 
adolescent gang members according to  National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and GREAT surveys); David 
Pyrooz and Gary Sweeten, Gang Membership Between Ages 5 and 17 Years in the United States, J. of 
Adolescent Health 1, 3 (2015)(noting that the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth establish that while gang 
participation is more common among black and Latino, the majority of self-reported gang members were white); 
Finn-Aage Esbensen & L. Thomas Winfree, Race and Gender Differences Between Gang and Nongang Youths:  
Results from a Multistate Survey, 15 Just. Q. 505, 510 (1998); Adrienne Freng & Finn-Aage Esbensen, Race and 
Gang Affiliation:  An Examination of Multiple Marginality, 24 JUSTICE QUARTERLY 600, 609 (December 
2007)(approximately 30% of gang youth in this study were white).  See also, Jordan Blair Woods, Systemic 
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Because criteria for the database do not require any criminality and there is no 
notice or right to appeal, there is a potential for the database to be or to become both vastly 
over-inclusive and demographically skewed. The track record for gang databases in other 
cities and states demonstrate this risk.101 A particularly good example of the potential 
impact that lack of criteria has on the racial makeup of databases can be seen in 
Minnesota.102 Minnesota maintained two databases, one of which, the Gang Pointer File, 
requires at least one conviction for a gross misdemeanor or felony, a minimum age of 14 
for inclusion, and three criteria from a 10-point list.103 A second database, GangNet, like 
the NYPD database, did not require any conviction or a minimum age for inclusion.104 In 
2009, the more demanding Gang Pointer database included about 2500 individuals, 36% 
of whom were white.105 The GangNet database was nearly seven times larger and included 
17,000 individuals, of whom only 18% were white.106 As this example illustrates, broad 
criteria for inclusion can lead to over-representation of youth of color and under-
representation of whites.107 Indeed, the community groups that held hearings on the 
Minnesota databases asked whether the criteria used to designate gang members were 
“synonymous with the urban youth culture.”108 
 
With the increased number of officers assigned to gang division intelligence 
gathering, we must consider what criteria should be in place before individuals can be 
added to the database. Further, we cannot be confident that the gang database represents 
the entirety of the intelligence gathered relating to suspected gang members. The database 
appears to be just one aspect of the intelligence-gathering machine. In fact, despite the 
doubling of the gang intelligence division under Operation Crew Cut in the fall of 2012, 
the number of gang members added to the database in first eight months 2013 was lower 
than in prior years. The intelligence collected by these officers may be going into other 
databases, may be broader than that kept in the gang databases, and may be disseminated 
and used in other ways. While the NYPD’s reply to a FOIL requesting what information is 
kept in the database was non-responsive, the databases maintained relating to the NYPD’s 
surveillance of Muslims since 9/11 may be instructive.109 As part of an intelligence-
gathering program, the NYPD debriefed Muslim individuals who were arrested for even 
minor offenses and maintained a detailed database. As the New York Times reports:  
 
After each interview, the detectives filed detailed reports about the 
                                                                                                                      
Racial Bias and RICO’s Application to Criminal Street and Prison Gangs, 17 Mich. J. of Race & Law 303, 307-
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107 Id. at 10, 22. 
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109 See generally Joseph Goldstein, Police Recruit Muslims to be Informers, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2014, at A1.  
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prisoner that were entered into a database. In many instances, they 
included the names of relatives, including children: “Subject daughter 
is ‘Myriam’, age 6 and youngest child is ‘Omar’ age 2 years,” stated 
part of a six-page report filed about a furniture salesman, who had been 
arrested for driving without a license and making an improper left 
turn.110 
 
Whether similar detailed statements are being assembled for those in gang 
databases and for others targeted by Operation Crew Cut, we cannot be sure. However, the 
NYPD Patrol Guide suggests that this may well be the case. The Patrol Guide identifies 
Gang Division Intelligence Officers who are available to debrief suspected gang members 
24/7.111 It further designates local Field Intelligence Officers and charges them to 
disseminate lists of gang members on a monthly basis.112 Other than the very broad non-
criminal criteria that relate to certification for the gang database, there are no established 
criteria for the additional intelligence gathering that the NYPD engages in as part of 
Operation Crew Cut and its Gang Intelligence Division. There is nothing in the criteria for 
certifying gang members that would prevent collection of detailed information even for 
individuals who have never been arrested or charged with any crime based on where they 
live, what they look like and who they are seen with. 
 
 The existence of parallel databases stemming from collaboration with the NYPD 
is evident in recent statements by New York County District Attorney’s Office. After 
tapping the NYPD to designate the 25 worst offenders in each of the 22 precincts in 
Manhattan, the DA’s Office went on to develop a list of about 9000 individuals of high 
interest that its Crime Strategies Unit considers the worst of the worst.113 The fact that the 
District Attorney averages over 400 persons of interest per precinct, rather than 25, likely 
reflects the broad collection of data from the surveillance and petty arrests of individuals 
consistent with Operation Crew Cut. It is worth noting that the number of people on this 
list is twice as high as the number of all violent felony arrests for 2014.114 Like the 
surveillance of Muslim drivers and food vendors arrested for minor offenses who are then 
debriefed, alleged gang members are also detained and questioned for very minor 
offenses.115 Based on this list, the prosecutors 
 
decide whom we should try to pull out for a debriefing. We don’t 
debrief people arrested for felonies because we don’t want to 
compromise a case. We pull people arrested on low-level misdemeanor 
charges, maybe two or three a week. We read them their Miranda 
rights. About 80 percent of them will talk. If you speak to a 16-year-
old, they might tell you, ‘This kid is running things, this kid is a 
hanger-on.’ That’s how we find out information like whether a gang 
has changed their name. We took down the Flow Boyz gang at the 
Robert F. Wagner housing project in 2012. But a lot of those gang 
members have aged out, and now there’s a new group of 14- and 15-
                                                
110 Id. 
111 NYPD, supra note 33, at 1. 
112 NYPD, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 212-103: CRIME INFORMATION CENTERS 3 (2010) (requiring field 
intelligence officers to post lists of “active gang members” who reside within the command by the 5th of each 
month). 
113 Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance Jr.’s “Moneyball” Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 7, 2014),  
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114 See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ADULT ARRESTS: 2005–2014 (2015), available at 
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year-olds who want their own set name. Through debriefings, we 
learned they call themselves Only the Wagner.116 
 
When suspect individuals go through the system, even for a minor offense, they may be 
pulled aside and subjected to interrogation based on this secret list. If we could be assured 
that the list was developed to actually target repeat violent offenders, we might (or might 
not) applaud such an effort, but the debriefing of 16 year-olds to get names of 14 and 15 
year-olds goes well beyond targeted enforcement, and is certainly not what a parent would 
expect prosecuting attorneys to do to an unrepresented teenager in a minor case. 
 
IV. THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF GANG SUPPRESSION TACTICS 
 
Although the narrative used to justify gang policing rests on the same two 
concepts – place and suspicion – as the justification for stop-and-frisk, the narrative can 
lead to even greater harms than the stop-and-frisk regime. First, the gang label permits and 
encourages even more aggressive and broader police intrusion than the stop-and-frisk 
narrative. The label affects police perception and behavior, prosecutorial behavior, 
suspected gang and crew members, and the broader community. Second, gang suppression 
policing may be counterproductive, leading to increased formation, cohesion, and 
longevity of gangs, and contributing to individual criminality and delinquency among 
youth. 
 
A.  The Impact of the Gang Narrative on Police, Suspects, and the Community 
 
1. Police Perceptions of Gang Problems. 
 
Although the narratives justifying the use of excessive stop-and-frisk and 
justifying gang policing are very similar, they differ in ways that make gang policing 
deeply troubling. Unlike a Terry stop, there are no legal pre-requisites for categorizing an 
individual as a gang member. Unlike a Terry stop, no criminal conduct must be suspected 
or established. Unlike Terry, there are no official rules or limits for whether a frisk is 
permissible or how a search might be conducted. And, unlike a Terry stop, there are no 
systems of review. Moreover, the central premise of the gang narrative—that gangs are 
responsible for most violent crime and engage in violence heedlessly and irrationally—
creates circumstances in which an officer approaching a suspected gang member is likely 
to view him not just with suspicion but with some level of fear and antagonism.  
 
The gang narrative has the power to distort police perception of the prevalence 
and violence of gangs and to trigger biases117 that affect policing. In a careful study of 
gang units in four western cities (Inglewood, CA, Albuquerque, NM, Las Vegas, NV, and 
Phoenix, AZ), Charles Katz and Vincent Webb outline some worrisome aspects of gang 
policing.118 After following and interviewing police officers from four gang units and their 
colleagues, these researchers observed a number of disturbing attitudes and trends. 
 
[T]he majority of the officers perceived the magnitude of their local 
gang problem to be greater than indicated by the official gang crime 
                                                
116 Id. 
117 Jessica J. Sim, Joshua Correll, & Melody Sadler, Understanding Police and Expert Performance: When 
Training Attenuates (vs. Exacerbates) Stereotypic Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 39 Personality & Soc. Psych. 
Bull. 291, 299 (2013)(finding that special unit officers in gang units demonstrate racial bias in the first-person-
shooter task (FPST) similar to untrained novices and unlike trained patrol officers). 
118 CHARLES M. KATZ & VINCENT J. WEBB, POLICING GANGS IN AMERICA (2006). 
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data recorded by their department. Except in Las Vegas, the vast 
majority of officers in each [gang] unit perceived that their city had a 
major gang problem, that gang members engaged in a wide variety of 
criminal behaviors, and that roughly 30 to 70% of all local crimes were 
probably attributable to gang members.119  
Gang units across the country similarly attribute 48 to 98% of violent crime to gangs120 
even though victim reports attribute only about 6% of violent crimes to gangs.121 
 
This misperception translated into action, as gang unit officers came to perceive 
their role as a duty to fight “evil perpetrators” and engaged in aggressive directed patrols 
and sweeps that focus on minor offenses in an attempt to deter gang membership.122 “All 
of the police departments reacted with zero-tolerance law enforcement for gang members, 
and by initiating gang sweeps and saturating gang neighborhoods.”123 The sweeps 
contributed to community complaints of over-policing and excessive force, even while 
community members continued to seek law enforcement assistance to address gang 
problems.124  
 
The use of the gang narrative enhances the sense of danger and dehumanizes the 
targets of enforcement. The fight against “evil perpetrators” can lead the police to engage 
in unlawful conduct. Such attitudes were at the root of the Rampart Scandal, in Los 
Angeles in which gang unit officers engaged in widespread misconduct and corruption.125 
In Phoenix, thirteen police officers shot at a gang member 89 times, striking him 30 
times.126 In Las Vegas an FBI investigation led to the arrest of two gang unit officers for 
engaging in a drive-by shooting.127 The attitudes that could lead to such an outcome were 
expressed by an officer in an anonymous statement to the press: 
 
As for the poor, stupid, innocent gang member, that has spread hatred, 
vandalism, crime, and murderous-intent-through-profit-motive –legacy 
of his organization, all that I can say is what goes around comes around 
. . . and THE only good gang member is a dead gang member.128 
 
2. Gang Policing Justifies Intensive Policing and Surveillance 
 
In west coast jurisdictions, where gang policing has long been practiced, the 
policing is often associated with very broad and intrusive practices. Suspected gang 
members may be included in civil injunctions that criminalize their presence in public 
places.129 These injunctions can prevent named individuals from participating in sports 
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teams, after school activities, taking public transportation, and going to job centers.130 
Some gang units engage in aggressive Broken-Windows style enforcement, ticketing 
suspected gang members for jaywalking and other minor traffic infractions.131 The NYPD 
has indicated that a similar strategy would be adopted as part of Operation Crew Cut, with 
officers focusing on picking kids up for truancy or ticketing them for bikes on sidewalks if 
they were suspected crew members.132 These minor arrests can lead to debriefing of 
minors who have never been arrested or accused of a violent offense, based on dress or 
association with other suspected gang or crew members. 
 
The intensive surveillance extends to following twitter feeds, monitoring 
Facebook (often by creating fake profiles of attractive young women), and monitoring 
YouTube videos.133 Whether the police should be engaged in this level of surveillance of 
youth for intelligence collection purposes, without any prior showing or justification, is an 
important question that merits serious consideration and is not one that should be 
answered in a kneejerk manner based on our fear of gangs. Police lists may be shared with 
immigration134 or potential employers135 and cause substantial collateral damages even in 
the absence of criminal convictions or arrests. 
 
The potential impact of gang intelligence was demonstrated quite dramatically in 
a case decided by the New York State Court of Appeals in 2014.136 In People v. Johnson, 
the defendant was standing on the sidewalk of 140th Street at 7th Avenue near three other 
men. At least two of them were allegedly members of the local gang, the 40 Wolves.137 
There was no information that the defendant was alleged to be a member of the 40 
Wolves.138 There was no testimony that any of the men had done anything other than stand 
on the block (where they lived) but the NYPD, nevertheless ordered them to disperse. 
When one of the men asked why they were being ordered to disperse, all four were 
arrested for disorderly conduct for failing to obey an order to disperse.139 In a search-
incident-to arrest, drugs were found on the defendant.140 At the suppression hearing the 
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officer testified that 40 Wolves members only associated with 40 Wolves members, and 
therefore, the defendant was a gang member.141 The prosecution elicited testimony that 
two of the men were 40 Wolves members based on “gang intelligence,” but objected to 
questioning by defense counsel to probe the basis for this intelligence.142  
 
The trial court denied suppression, and the intermediate appeals court issued a 
sweeping ruling that police who had information “about gang problems . . . at that location 
in the past and the gang background of several of the men” could order dispersal and 
arrest the men if they disobeyed.143 The Appellate Division’s decision, if upheld, would 
have allowed police to order anyone that they claimed was a member of a local crew or 
gang off their own block and arrest them for disobeying.144 
 
In a per curiam decision, the New York Court of Appeals stepped in to protect 
the right to stand peaceably in a public place. As the Court wrote, “It is understandable 
that police officers become concerned when people they believe to be gang members and 
their associates gather in public. It is not disorderly conduct, however, for a small group of 
people, even people of bad reputation, to stand peaceably on a street corner.”145 Although, 
this decision forecloses arrest based on the theory of disorderly conduct advanced in the 
Johnson case, there are many ways to achieve similar results by asserting gang allegations. 
In many jurisdictions, moral panics about the dangers of gang violence have led to civil 
gang injunctions and curfews that have left alleged gang members and other youth without 
the right to stand in their own neighborhoods and without a basis to challenge gang 
classifications.146 
 
Under a stop-and-frisk regime, the police are required to articulate reasonable 
suspicion that the individual had engaged or was about to engage in a crime.147 If the 
Court of Appeals had upheld the Appellate Division’s decision, reputation alone, and not 
criminality, would be enough to compromise both an alleged gang member’s right to stand 
on the street and the right of anyone standing with him, whether that person was aware of 
the alleged gang affiliation or not. The surveillance and intelligence gathering of 
Operation Crew Cut create databases for those who have never been arrested or accused of 
any crime, where the Criminal Procedure Law would not permit the retention of such data 
after a stop. 
 
3. The Gang Narrative Harms Community Relations 
 
Gang or crew allegations affect not only those who voluntarily associate with 
gang members, but can render entire communities vulnerable to militaristic anti-gang 
tactics.  
 
At six a.m. on June 3, 2014, hundreds of police officers in riot gear descended on 
the Grant and Manhattanville housing projects as helicopters roared overhead.148 The 
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police broke down doors and ordered residents, including children, to the floor at 
gunpoint.149 This raid was New York City’s “largest ever gang bust” according to 
Reuters.150  
 
The purported goal was to arrest 64 individuals who were charged with crimes 
related to feuds between crews in the two projects that have simmered for at least three 
years.151 But when the dust settled, one in three of the wanted individuals remained at 
large.152 
 
These 64 were among 103 individuals charged in two conspiracy indictments.  
The most serious of the substantive crimes charged in the conspiracy were 2 homicides 
and approximately 50 shootings (causing 19 injuries).153 For at least one of the homicides, 
that of Tayshana Murphy in 2009, two individuals had already been convicted and 
imprisoned.154 The 103 charged were charged based on theories of accessorial liability 
(primarily conspiracy).155 A major form of evidence supporting these charges are the 
communications relating to the on-going rivalry between the Grant Houses-based 3 Staccs 
gang and the Manhattanville-based Make it Happen Boys and Money Avenue. During the 
years between the killing of Tayshana Murphy and the conspiracy arrests, the NYPD 
listened to telephone calls from Rikers, followed social media postings of the kids in the 3 
Staccs, Make it Happen Boys, and Money Avenue gangs/crews, and collaborated with the 
Manhattan District Attorneys office to assemble evidence to charge these 103 individuals 
with conspiracy to commit homicide, to possess weapons, and to commit various 
assaults.156  
 
Although most of those indicted for conspiracy in the first degree and other 
charges that carry potential life sentences engaged in some form of non-communicative 
conduct, 9 of the 103 were not characterized as committing substantial criminal 
conduct.157 Others were present for one or two street encounters over the course of 
years.158 Yet others had pleaded guilty years earlier, had already served part or all of their 
sentences, and were indicted and faced prosecution based on the same predicate acts in the 
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Manhattan District Attorney’s new conspiracy charges.159 
 
 Moreover, while the NYPD and the District Attorney amassed evidence in the 
form of gang member communications to charge these 103 individuals, the residents of 
Grant Houses and Manhattanville sought assistance at the precinct level to diffuse tensions 
and provide alternatives for the warring factions.160 How much violence could have been 
prevented if the NYPD and District Attorney had worked with community members to 
intervene and mediate conflicts rather than secretly recording, watching and amassing 
information?  
 
The raid on Grant and Manhattanville Houses is deeply troublesome in two 
respects. First, one may question the wisdom of watching, listening, spying, waiting and 
then using conspiracy charges to link dozens of young people to offenses committed by 
others instead of intervening to defuse the rivalry. Second, one may wonder how a 
military-style raid to accomplish regular law enforcement goals affects police-community 
relations. Having obtained the indictment and surveilled the individuals for years, why 
enter their homes wearing bulletproof vests, with firearms drawn, pointing weapons at 
family members, while helicopters whir overhead? While some members of the 
community may applaud such tactics, at least one former gang member reported that for 
youth in those neighborhoods, the tactics elevated the arrested individuals to “rock star” 
status and glorified the reputation and standing of crews in the eyes of some vulnerable 
youth.161  
 
B.  Gang Suppression as a Catalyst to Gang Formation and Individual Criminality 
 
Even if one accepts that an intelligence and suppression strategy such as 
Operation Crew Cut extends to non-gang members, former gang members, and gang 
members who are not actively involved in any collective crime or violent conduct, one 
may question whether anti-gang policing does any harm. If an individual is not engaged in 
gang activity, then surely he or she has nothing to worry about? Surely the overarching 
message that gangs and crews will be watched and dealt with harshly will be a balm to at-
risk communities and a deterrence to those who would become gang members. 
Unfortunately, like the overbroad use of stop-and-frisk, the impact of gang-suppression 
tactics reaches far beyond the alleged gang or crew member. Gang suppression units often 
resort to stops and minor arrests to garner information about suspected gang members and 
to communicate that police, and not gangs, control neighborhoods. Moreover, even when 
gang suppression tactics are used against actual gang members, law enforcement 
opposition can serve to increase individual criminality, entrench gang affiliation, increase 
gang membership, and prolong gang ties. 
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1. Gang Formation 
 
From the earliest studies of street gangs, the transition from informal youth peer 
group to true gang status has been attributed to oppositional forces.162 The informal peer 
group tends to form in neighborhoods with limited resources and to be based on 
geographic proximity.163 In many ways, the “crews” described by the NYPD fit this 
model. These groups form for protection and to ensure access to limited recreational 
space.164 Often opposition comes in the form of other informal peer groups. The police, 
however, can contribute to the transition from informal group to gang status by treating 
groups as if they are gangs. 
 
After an exhaustive study of informal youth groupings and gangs in the early 
twentieth century in Chicago, Frederic Thrasher identified the catalyst that turns typical 
youth groupings and delinquent groups into gangs. That catalyst is opposition. The 
opposition can come either from other gangs or from the police. As Thrasher outlines the 
move from informal groupings based on neighborhood and age group to gang: 
 
[A] play-group may acquire a real organization. Natural leaders emerge, 
a relative standing is assigned to various members and traditions 
develop. It does not become a gang, however, until it begins to excite 
disapproval and opposition, and thus acquires a more definite group-
consciousness. It discovers a rival or an enemy in the gang in the next 
block; its baseball or football team is pitted against some other team; 
parents or neighbors look upon it with suspicion or hostility; “the old 
man around the corner,” the storekeepers, or the “cops” begin to give it 
“shags” (chase it); or some representative of the community steps in and 
tries to break it up. This is the real beginning of the gang, for now it 
starts to draw itself more closely together. It becomes a conflict 
group.165 
 
Police recognition and suppression efforts confirm and consolidate gang structure, gang 
identity, and gang duration. Suppression of gangs, like trimming back certain shrubs, is 
one means of encouraging gang growth. 
 
The contrast between New York City’s experience and that of cities which 
adopted aggressive gang suppression strategies in the past fifty years supports the 
conclusion that gang suppression may increase gang cohesion and membership.166 The 
Justice Policy Institute study Gang Wars traces the divergent approaches to gang problems 
in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago from World War II to present.167 In New York 
the Youth Board was established in the mid-fifties and street gang workers were 
dispatched to troubled neighborhoods throughout the city. The street gang workers, who 
were not law enforcement officers, gave advice, took kids on trips, helped them find jobs, 
and intervened to attempt to negotiate truces or even alert law enforcement of fights and 
weapons.168 In addition to street workers, the social work model based on the Chicago 
                                                




166 Greene & Pranis, supra note 19, at 68. 
167 Id. at 14. 
168 Id. at 15-16. 
 UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5 26 
Area Project “used local residents as family counselors and organizers in their 
neighborhoods to engage . . . youth and adults in projects designed to improve and 
strengthen social control in the community.”169 Truces were negotiated, and gang violence 
largely abated by the mid 1960s.170 This is not to claim that there are no gangs in New 
York, but as discussed in part IB above, the number of offenses attributed to gang violence 
has been consistently low in New York. The “gangs” that do exist are little more than the 
informal peer groups as observed by Frederic Thrasher and are not organized criminal 
associations. Not even the NYPD claims that the “crews” they are now targeting are 
anything like organized crime groups or hierarchical established gangs.171 
 
This is not the case in cities where gangs have been vigorously repressed and 
suppressed by law enforcement. In cities like Chicago and Los Angeles, gangs have 
become institutionalized, and persist across generations. 
 
In Chicago, the police have engaged in round after round of gang suppression. 
The result of these efforts has not been elimination of gangs. The strength and level of 
organization of gangs has been linked to these suppression efforts. In a move that sounds 
much like the expansion of the NYPD’s gang unit, in the late sixties “the gang intelligence 
unit was increased from 38 to 200 officers” for political reasons rather than because of 
violent crime.172 In the years that followed, the Unit engaged in an intensive campaign of 
harassment that led to greater incarceration and greater resistance of those incarcerated to 
prison authority.173 Prisons became gang-dominated institutions, and imprisonment served 
to cement gang bonds and gang power rather than deter gangs or undermine their power. 
Successive attempts at gang suppression, such as the city ordinance that was overturned in 
Chicago v. Morales,174 have done little to improve matters. Prosecution and imprisonment 
of the leadership of the largest gang, the Gangster Disciples, has contributed to more gang 
factions and more violence.175 
 
Similarly, in Los Angeles, the police have attempted to suppress gangs through 
force, arrests, and injunctions. The STEP Act has provided prosecutors with tools to 
obtain lengthy sentence enhancements.176 Yet,  
 
[d]espite massive, militarized police actions, strict civil injunctions, 
draconian sentencing enhancements, and a gang database that appears 
to criminalize upwards of half of its young African American residents, 
gang violence is worsening, according to media reports. With a 
reported 729 active gangs and 39,488 gang members Los Angeles 
remains the dubious honor of being the gang capital of the world.177 
 
 The observation that opposition spurs gang development along with the 
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dominance of gangs in cities that have adopted aggressive anti-gang suppression tactics 
suggests that pursuing anti-gang tactics in the absence of serious gang problems is unwise. 
Indeed, even where gang problems are serious, the periods of relative calm in Los Angeles 
and Chicago have coincided with negotiated truces and community engagement, not with 
law enforcement crackdowns.178 It is not surprising that policing and prosecution of 
peripheral or non-gang members followed by incarceration of these individuals with core 
members will create or cement gang ties leading to more cohesion over time.  
 
2. Individual Criminality 
 
Aggressive policing does not simply encourage gang cohesion; it can also 
contribute to individual delinquency and criminality. Negative contact with law 
enforcement and contact that is perceived of as unfair can contribute to unwillingness to 
conform to the law in several ways. First, procedural justice research establishes that 
people are much more willing to conform to the law when they are treated fairly and with 
respect.179 For those who experience police surveillance as harassment, are treated harshly 
during arrests, and are prejudged as alleged gang members if arrested for even a minor 
offense, the perceived unfairness of the treatment may reduce willingness to comply with 
the law and the perception that law enforcement is legitimate.180 Additionally, labeling 
theory posits that when one is labeled as delinquent, one is more likely to associate with 
delinquent peers and behave in delinquent ways.181 The raids, high bail requests, double-
jeopardy defying reindictments,182 and fake Facebook friend requests all undermine the 
legitimacy of law enforcement and respect for the criminal justice system. Labeling and 
segregation, particularly in jails and prisons, may encourage rather than deter delinquent 
conduct. 
 
Whether or not these theories correctly explain the impact of negative contact 
with police and the criminal justice system, there can be no doubt that these factors are 
causally connected to increased delinquency, criminality and violence. There is strong 
proof that negative police contact in fact contributes to criminality. Ironically, one of the 
best sources of proof for this is the research done in connection with a gang intervention 
program that targets at risk youth at the middle school age.  
 
The GREAT program is a gang intervention program that has been carefully 
evaluated by researchers. The program brings law enforcement representatives to schools 
to talk to young people about the dangers of gangs. The program covers 31 schools in 7 
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cities183 and the final sample includes 2614 youth.184 The program has success in that the 
GREAT program substantially reduced gang membership by 39%.185 However, the 
decrease in gang membership is not matched by a decrease in violent crime or general 
delinquency.186 The first lesson of the GREAT program should be that deterring gang 
membership and deterring violent crime are two different things. Each may be valuable, 
but decreasing gang membership does not automatically reduce crime or violence.  
 
A second and equally important lesson of the GREAT research and related social 
science research is that police and criminal justice intervention increase delinquency and 
violence independent of any other factor.187 Controlling for initial rates of delinquency, the 
study follows youth over time, and thus can compare individuals with negative police 
contact to similar individuals without negative police contact (stops or arrests) and 
determine if the negative police contact independently predicts a reduction in delinquent 
acts (as deterrence theory would predict) or an increase in delinquency (as procedural 
justice and labeling theories would predict).188 
 
 The lesson of the GREAT research is not only clear but it is quite dramatic. 
Controlling for initial levels of delinquency, those who are stopped by police engage in 
nearly 60% more delinquent acts than those who have no contact with police.189 Those 
who are arrested engage in 230% more delinquent acts than those with no contact.190 And 
those who are arrested engage in nearly twice as many delinquent acts as those who are 
merely stopped.191 In responding to questions about their attitudes toward delinquent 
behaviors and delinquent peers: 
 
[Y]outh who have been stopped or arrested report significantly less 
anticipated guilt, greater agreement with neutralization techniques, 
greater commitment to delinquent peers, and higher levels of 
delinquency than youth with no police contact. In addition, our findings 
show that the negative consequences of police contact are compounded 
for arrested youth; subsequent to arrest they report less anticipated guilt 
and more delinquency compared with stopped youth.192  
 
The rich data from the GREAT research provides affirmative lessons about the 
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relationship between policing, delinquency, and violent crime. The GREAT researchers 
had extensive data from the program participants about their backgrounds, risk factors, 
and delinquent behavior. The researchers also followed the GREAT participants over 
time. There can be little doubt that negative suppression tactics such as those proposed in 
connection with Operation Crew Cut are likely to increase individual delinquency and 
commitment to delinquent peers. 
 
 In similar research analyzing 1,000 youth from the Rochester Youth 
Development Study of seventh and eighth graders, the effect of juvenile justice 
intervention was to increase the odds of serious delinquency by a factor of 5.5 by Wave 
4.193 As in the GREAT experiments, the researchers control for initial levels of 
delinquency and substance abuse. Whether these results stem from the label “juvenile 
delinquent” or the fact that juvenile justice intervention increases contact with delinquent 
peers, it is evident that suppression efforts are far more likely to increase delinquency than 
to reduce it. 
 
 This research is not intended to suggest that stops, arrests, or juvenile justice 
interventions are never appropriate. Rather the lesson is that these should be avoided 
where delinquency is not severe. The broad net of anti-gang policing tends to catch the 
suspected, the marginal, the former, or the wannabe gang members together with the core 
members. Databases, surveillance and mass-prosecutions encourage these trends. These 
interventions are likely to significantly increase delinquent behavior for those who are 
targeted. If the goal is actually to reduce violence, then expanding policing to those who 
live on gang blocks and associate with any other gang member, which is virtually 
unavoidable in some circumstances, will undermine this goal in the long term. 
 
V. ALTERNATIVES APPROACHES TO REDUCING GANG CRIME 
 
As discussed above, intensive gang suppression policing is damaging to police, 
community, and at-risk youth. This is particularly so where the underlying gang problem 
is exaggerated and is a pretext for intensive surveillance. The research and history of gang 
suppression tactics by law enforcement instructs that suppression tactics are often 
ineffective and counterproductive. The oppositional nature of gang formation and the 
effect of labeling theory means that the greater the gang suppression effort, the larger the 
gang problem will likely become. 
 
Fortunately, New York City has a history of successfully using non-law 
enforcement interventions to reduce gang violence. In the 1960s, New York relied on non-
law enforcement street workers and community social work models to connect at-risk 
youth with services, to mediate conflicts, and to notify law enforcement when serious 
violent confrontation was anticipated. While these programs were disbanded in the 1970s, 
the collaboration with street workers and community groups who were not law 
enforcement provides a model for working with the crew or gang-involved youth today. 
 
The Chicago Ceasefire/SNUG (guns spelled backward) model takes the non-law 
enforcement street worker model a step further by mobilizing former gang members and 
convicts as outreach workers and violence interrupters.194 New York State has funded 
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SNUG initiatives with significant reductions of shootings in Albany and Rochester.195 
 
Building on New York’s history with non-law enforcement outreach workers and 
the Chicago model, several community-based organizations have developed in New York 
and have been credited with substantial reductions in gang related violence. In East New 
York, Brooklyn, the neighborhood development organization Man Up! has used former 
gang members as mentors and mediators and violence interrupters.196 Similarly, in Crown 
Heights, Save Our Streets replicated the Cure Violence Model, reducing shootings in the 
target area by 6% at a time when adjacent comparable neighborhoods experienced an 
increase in gun violence of 18 and 28%t.197 These are examples of community-based 
groups that engage directly to defuse violent conflicts and protect communities and gang 
members. 
 
Successful programming need not be based on or targeted at gang or crew 
members to be effective. Recognizing that gang membership and violence are independent 
of each other (GREAT, for example, decreases gang membership but does not affect 
violence), it is important that the goal of preventing violence be the focus. Programs that 
reach all youth and keep them in school or get them jobs can prevent violence as 
effectively as those targeted at gang members. Tutoring in algebra and other subjects in 
Chicago has reduced drop-out rate and violence in at-risk youth.198 Job and employment 
programs have long been associated with reduced gang membership, leaving gangs, and 
reduced violence.199 
 
The Boston Ceasefire Program does instruct that law enforcement and even law 
enforcement intelligence can play an important role in reducing gang violence when it is 
properly targeted.200 The Boston Ceasefire Program identified the most violent offenders 
and brought them in to meet with law enforcement and community leaders. Rather than 
collecting data secretly as the NYPD Operation Crew Cut does and bringing massive 
indictments seeking decades-long sentences based on conspiracy charges, the Boston 
Ceasefire surveillance data was used to accomplish specific deterrence. Individuals 
identified as most likely to commit violent crime were brought to public meetings, told 
they were being observed and offered assistance.201 
 
Another alternative to the current NYPD suppression strategy that is well 
supported by research relating to gang formation and violence would be to do nothing at 
all. Gang researchers concur that the vast majority of gang members age out of gangs and 
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gang violence with no intervention.202 While neglect is not preferable to employment, 
counseling, violence prevention, and educational improvements, these strategies should 
ideally be carried out by community-based groups, not law enforcement. Because police 
contact, stops, arrests, prosecution, imprisonment, and juvenile justice involvement are all 
factors that tend to increase delinquency, gang membership, and violence, it would be far 
better to do nothing than to engage in the intensive policing of vulnerable youth.203 New 
York has had little in the way of gang policing during the past three decades and has fared 
far better than localities that use aggressive gang suppression tactics. These different 
experiences provide some of the most compelling proof that gang suppression is a catalyst 
for, not a solution, to gang violence. 
 
In addition to using a social work model of intervention for general crime 
deterrence, and a limited and targeted law enforcement model for working with violent 
criminals, narrow and enforceable criteria must be developed to maintain databases that 
are not overbroad. While the details of appropriate inclusion criteria, oversight, notice and 
appeal provisions, maintenance, and security measures for such database are beyond the 
scope of this paper, the databases must, at a minimum, be narrowly tailored with 
requirements of actual criminality, notice to those included and to parents of minors, and 




By all accounts, New York City has enjoyed a tremendous drop in all crime and 
particularly in violent crime during the past 25 years. This drop has been accomplished 
without intensive gang policing or prosecutions. During this time, the NYPD has always 
recorded a low number of gang crimes. Nonetheless, during the death-throws of the 
NYPD’s stop-and-frisk regime in New York City the NYPD announced a new threat in 
the form of “crews,” and, despite continuing crime declines, quadrupled the number of 
Gang Division officers dedicated to watching and policing these youth of color. This 
announcement manipulates and exaggerates an existing phenomenon to increase support 
for a new profile-based policing. The NYPD’s gang division and databases permit 
extensive surveillance of suspect populations, and essentially recreate and expand the 
scope of the blanket stop-and-frisk regime without the potential for court supervision. Like 
the stop-and-frisk regime before it, the strategy will exacerbate tensions with communities 
of color and sweep up innocent and guilty alike. Unlike stop-and-frisk, there is currently 
no effective oversight to limit the extent of surveillance or information collected relating 
to vulnerable youth. Most importantly, these strategies are unsuited to actually reducing 
problems of gang and youth violence and have historically increased rather than decreased 
gang violence and the costs associated with it. Rather than following west-coast 
forerunners into a cycle of gang suppression, long sentences, and community disruption, 
New York should build on its history of non-law enforcement outreach to provide 
productive alternatives to gang involvement. This article should also prompt other 
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